The main feature of the penalty schemes described in current sentencing guidelines is that the …ne is based on the accumulated gains from cartel or price-…xing activities for the …rm. These gains are usually di¢ cult to estimate, but they can be approximated by a fraction of the turnover. The regulations thus suggest modeling the penalty as an increasing function of the accumulated illegal gains from price-…xing to the …rm, so that the history of the violation is taken into account.
Introduction.
This paper analyses the optimal policies for the deterrence of violations of antitrust law. We study the e¤ects of penalty schemes, determined according to current US and EU antitrust laws, on the behavior of the …rm. We investigate intertemporal aspects of this problem using a dynamic optimal control model of utility maximization by the …rm under antitrust enforcement. This paper addresses the problem of whether the …ne, determined on the basis of accumulated turnover of the …rm participating in a cartel, can provide a complete deterrence outcome.
We assume that the imposed …ne takes into account the history of the violation. This means that when the violation of antitrust law is discovered, the regulator is able to observe all accumulated rents from cartel formation. Consequently, it will impose the …ne that takes into account this information. We also compare the deterrence power of this system with the …xed penalty scheme.
The OECD report (2002) provides a description of the available sanctions for cartels according to the laws of member countries 1 . Those laws allow for considerable …nes against enterprises found to have participated in price-…xing agreements. In some cases, however, the maximal …nes determined by these laws may not be su¢ ciently large to accommodate multiples of the gain to the cartel, as suggested by expected utility theory. In most of the countries the maximal …nes are expressed either in absolute terms or as a percentage (10%) of the overall annual turnover of the …rm 2 . However, according to experts' estimations, the best policy is to impose the penalties, which are a multiple of the illegal gains from price-…xing agreements to the …rms. This, of course, would be di¢ cult to estimate in real life, so it is still common practice to use the percentage of turnover as a proxy of the gains from price-…xing activities.
Several countries, namely the US, Germany, and New Zealand, have already accommodated this more advanced system. Instead of total turnover, in the US and Germany the maximal …ne is stated in terms of unlawful gains. In Germany the maximal …ne equals the maximum of the administrative …ne of EUR 511518 or three times the additional pro…t from the cartel. In the US the maximal …ne is the maximum of USD 10 million or twice the gain to the cartel 3 .
New Zealand has the most advanced system. It provides for three alternatives: the maximum of NZD 10 million, three times the illegal gain, or if the illegal gain is not known, 10% of the 1 "Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions Against Cartels." OECD report 2002 . 2 Guidelines on the method of setting of …nes imposed for violations of competition law in Europe (1998) 3 US sentencing guidelines for organizations (2001) total annual turnover of the enterprise. In general, the determination of the …nal amount of the …ne, to be paid by the …rm in each particular case, is based on the degree of o¤ence, which is proportional either to the amount of accumulated illegal gains from the cartel or to its proxy, turnover involved throughout entire duration of infringement.
So, we can conclude that the current penalty schemes for antitrust law violations are mainly based on the turnover involved in the infringement throughout the entire duration of the infringement, which serves as a proxy of the accumulated gains from cartel or price-…xing activities for the …rm. At the same time there exists an upper bound for the penalties for violations of antitrust law. The …ne is constrained from above by the maximum of a certain monetary amount, a multiple of the illegal gains from the cartel, or if the illegal gain is not known, 10% of the total annual turnover of the enterprise. The idea of the current paper is to incorporate these features of the current penalty systems into a dynamic model of intertemporal utility maximization by a …rm, which is subject to antitrust enforcement.
Similar to Fent et al. (1999) , the set up of the problem leads to an optimal control model.
The main di¤erence compared to Fent et al. (1999) or Feichtinger (1983) is that the gain from the cartel accumulated by the …rm over the period of infringement takes the role of a state variable, whereas the idea of Fent et al. (1999) was to take the o¤ender's criminal record as a state variable of the dynamic game. An increase in the state variable is thus positively related to the degree of price …xing by the …rm, and increases the …ne the …rm can expect in case of being convicted.
Furthermore, this framework allows us to analyze the consequences of two major modi…cations of the penalty systems for violations of competition law, which have been recently suggested by the OECD and US Department of Justice (DOJ). The modi…cation suggested by the OECD was concerned with the increase of the multiplier for the base …ne, while DOJ 4 suggests to increase the upper bound for the …ne up to $100 million. By solving the optimal control problem of the …rm under antitrust enforcement, we will investigate the implications of the di¤erent penalty schedules.
The main results are that, for the benchmark case, i.e., when the penalty is …xed, the outcome with complete deterrence of cartel formation is possible but only at the cost of shutting down the …rm. In other words, the …xed penalty, which can ensure complete deterrence, is too high, because it leads to immediate bankruptcy. However, the result can be improved by relating the penalty to the illegal gains from price-…xing. The proportional scheme appears to 4 The twelfth annual report. DOJ 1998. http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/1583.html be more appropriate than the …xed penalty, since it can ensure complete deterrence in the long run even in case penalties are moderate. We also study the impact of the main parameters of the penalty scheme (probability and severity of punishment) on the e¢ ciency of deterrence and analyze the optimal trade-o¤ between changes in the scale parameter of the proportional penalty scheme and probability of law enforcement. It turns out that, the higher the probability and severity of punishment, the earlier the cartel formation is blocked. The sensitivity analysis
shows that when the penalties are already high, the antitrust policy aiming at a further increase in the severity of punishment is less e¢ cient than the policy that increases the probability of punishment.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the general setup of an optimal control model of the …rm under antitrust enforcement. In section 3 we consider the case where the upper bound for the penalty is an exogenously given …xed monetary amount. Moreover, we will derive an analytical expression for this upper bound, which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence of price-…xing. In section 4 we investigate the implications of the penalty being proportional to the accumulated gains from price-…xing. We also conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium values of the variables of the model with respect to the parameters of the penalty scheme. Section 5 summarizes the results of the analysis and suggests directions for future work.
2 Optimal control model. The general setup.
We introduce the basic ingredients of the intertemporal optimization problem of a pro…t maximizing …rm, which participates in an illegal cartel. The key variable is the accumulated gains from prior criminal o¤ences (in case of a cartel, these o¤ences are price-…xing activities).
Dynamics of the accumulated rents from price-…xing.
The accumulated rents from price-…xing, w(t), is the state variable of the model, which increases depending on the degree of o¤ence (price-…xing). Using a continuous time scale the dynamics of the accumulated rents from price-…xing equals 5
:
w(0) = w 0 0:
5 To simplify the analysis for the rest of this section we assume w0 = 0: However, relaxing this assumption does not change the results stated in propositions of the paper.
Where : w(t) stands for the change in the value of the state variable, q(t) denotes the degree of price-…xing by the …rm at instant t, and w 0 is the initial wealth of the …rm before the start of the planning horizon. Expression (1) rests on the assumption of the demand function being linear. A complete derivation of expression (1) is given in Appendix 1 of the paper, where
is associated with instantaneous producer surplus for the …rm caused by …xing price levels above the competitive level. The main idea behind this formulation is that cartel formation leads to higher prices. The "normal" price is c (competitive equilibrium) leading to zero pro…ts. Then q denotes the degree of violation, i.e. when the cartel …xes a higher price than "normal". From the de…nition of q in the Appendix it is clear that in case of such a violation, i.e. when price is higher than competitive level, q is positive. Based on the simple linear demand function 6 , pro…t, or producer surplus, can be expressed as a concave function of q. Now the state variable w(t) adds up the pro…ts over time, and as such w(t) is the total gain from crime (too high prices) from time 0 up to t.
There are strong legal and economic reasons for introduction of the state variable in the form of accumulated rents from price-…xing. It is related to the fact, that in US and EU guidelines for imposition of …nes for antitrust violations, the penalty imposed in many cases is based mainly on the turnover involved in the infringement throughout the entire duration of the infringement. Clearly, the accumulated turnover serves as a proxy for accumulated gains from cartel or price-…xing activities for the …rm.
In addition, according to the OECD survey, the …nes imposed recently, expressed as a percentage of the gain, varied widely, from 3% to 189%. In only four cases the …nes were more than 100% of the estimated gain, and in no case the …ne was as high as two or three times the gain, as recommended by some experts. So, we can conclude that sanctions actually imposed have not reached the optimal level for deterrence, which, according to a well known Becker's (1968) result, suggests that the …ne should be a multiple of illegal gains.
Pro…t function.
The instantaneous illegal gains from price-…xing for the …rm equal m q(t)(2 q(t)): This function has been derived from the microeconomic model underlying the problem of price…xing 7 . Obviously, this function implies that the marginal pro…t for the …rm is always positive and strictly declining in the interval q(t) 2 [0; 1]. Moreover, for each positive level of o¤ence the pro…t is also positive.
6 See Appendix. 7 For complete derivation of this expression see appendix.
The instantaneous pro…t at time t will also be in ‡uenced by accumulated rents from price…xing. This variable also measures the experience the …rm has in forming a cartel. The more it has experience, the more e¢ ciently the …rm colludes and, consequently, the higher the instantaneous pro…ts from price-…xing. This in ‡uence is re ‡ected in the term w(t) which enters additively the objective function of the …rm (see expression (4) below) 8 .
Law enforcement policy:
The goal of the current section is to incorporate the features of the penalty system for antitrust law violations, described above, into the optimal control model of intertemporal utility maximization by the …rm in the presence of a benevolent antitrust authority, whose aim is to minimize the loss of consumer surplus, i.e. to block any degree of price-…xing. So, in order to capture the speci…cs of the sentencing guidelines and current antitrust practice, we model the penalty for violations of antitrust law as a linear increasing function of the accumulated rents from price-…xing for the …rm. Therefore, it can be written as
This setup will also allow to study the e¤ects of the changes of the multiplier for the base …ne (re…nement suggested by OECD) on the deterrence power of the penalty scheme.
According to Becker (1968) the cost of di¤ erent punishment to an o¤ ender can be made comparable by converting them into their monetary equivalent or worth. And this is satis…ed in our model, since we measure the accumulated rents from price-…xing for the …rm in monetary units.
Moreover, our speci…cation of the penalty function satis…es three main conditions speci…ed in Fent et al. (1999) , namely:
1. It is strictly increasing in the level of o¤ence (since w(t) is strictly increasing in q(t)).
2. Firms which do not collude at all should not be punished: s(w 0 ) = 0: 3. Any detected positive level of o¤ence should lead to a positive amount of punishment:
s(w(t)) > 0; for any w(t) > w 0 , which is equivalent to q(t) > 0 for some t 2 that, if the …rm has been checked, violated the law in the current period and participated in the cartel in some of the previous periods, the …ne will be imposed on the basis of the whole accumulated gains from price-…xing, w(t), and thus not only on the basis of the current degree of o¤ence, q(t):
Further, we will compare the e¢ ciency and deterrence power of the penalty systems for a model in which the penalty is given by expression (2) and a model in which the penalty is …xed (s(t) = S max ), where S max is the …xed upper bound for the penalty introduced in the sentencing guidelines, which is not related to the level of o¤ence.
Costs of being punished.
The cost of being punished at time t equals the expected value of the …ne that has to be paid. This will be de…ned as the multiple of the probability of being checked by antitrust authority, p (level of law enforcement); times the degree of o¤ence at time t, q(t); times the level of punishment, which depends on time as well:
So, the expected penalty is determined by expression (3), where pq(t) is the probability of being punished at time t and s(t) is the …ne. which may either be …xed or can be expressed as a function of accumulated gains from price-…xing.
We should stress here that the …rm can only be caught at time t if q(t) > 0; i.e. the o¤ence is committed exactly at this time. Of course this need not be the case for criminal acts in general: you can convict a thief, if the police has found the stolen things without having caught the burglar in action. 9 However, it does apply to antitrust law practices. According to the US sentencing guidelines (2001) and OECD report (2002), investigation concerning past behavior only starts at the moment it is observed that the current price exceeds the competitive price, thus when q(t) > 0. After this is proved (usually on the basis of empirical analysis of price mark-ups), the antitrust authority will start a more detailed investigation and get access to accounting books and documents that can prove the existence of a cartel agreement. Only after that the gains from price-…xing (w(t)) become "perfectly observable", so that the court (or competition authority) can take them into account while determining the amount of …ne to be paid. 9 We thank an anonymous referee who pointed out this di¤erence.
Here it is also important to realize that the probability of being caught at instant t is pq(t).
So that the …rm can only be caught at time t 1 if it does price …xing on that date, so if q(t 1 ) > 0.
Later in time, say at time t 2 > t 1 , the …rm cannot be punished because of the o¤ence at time t 1 . At t 2 it can only be caught and punished if q(t 2 ) > 0. At the moment the …rm is caught it has to pay a …ne, s(t). In one scenario this …ne is an increasing function of w(t). So this means that if the …rm did a lot of price-…xing in the past, implying that w(t) is large, the …ne will be larger. In this sense repeated o¤enders are more heavily punished, and this is what quite frequently happens in modern democratic societies. So if the …rm is caught at time t 2 , it is convicted for the crime on t 2 , and the level of the …ne depends on what the …rm did in the past, thus also what it did at time t 1 < t 2 as well. In other words, the higher the degree of price …xing at t 1 , the larger the …ne will be at t 2 . This is independent of how many times the …rm was caught in the past: the …ne the …rm paid before will not be subtracted from w. Since w is non-decreasing over time, it is implicitly taken into account that repeated o¤enders will be more heavily punished. 10
Optimization problem.
The …rm making the decision about the degree of price-…xing faces the following intertemporal decision problem:
The parameter r is the discount rate. The objective functional J(q(t)) is the discounted pro…t stream gained from engaging in price-…xing activities. The term m q(t)(2 q(t)) re ‡ects the instantaneous rents from collusion and the term s(t)p(t)q(t) re ‡ects the possible punishment for the …rm, if it is caught. Note that the higher the degree of collusion, the higher the q(t), the higher the expected punishment. w(t) re ‡ects the experience of the …rm in cartel formation which increases future instantaneous gains from cartel formation.
1 0 In reality it works as follows. If the …rm is convicted for the second time its …ne is increasing in the amount of price …xing, but compared to the …ne for the …rst conviction, the …ne to be paid for the second conviction will be multiplied with a higher number. To model this, ideally after the …rst conviction the …ne is w(t1), while for the second conviction the …ne should be c (w(t2) w(t1)) with c > 1. We did not see a chance to model this in a tractable optimal control framework. Therefore, we decided to approximate this with having a …ne equal to w(t). Since w(t) is non-decreasing over time, it is implicitly taken into account that repeated o¤enders will be more heavily punished.
Having made the assumptions of section 2 we de…ne the current value Hamiltonian:
where (t) is the current value adjoint variable representing the shadow price of the o¤ence.
The Hamiltonian is well-de…ned and di¤erentiable for all nonnegative values of the state variable w(t) and all values of the control variable q(t) in its domain [0; 1].
3 Analysis of the model where the penalty is represented by a …xed monetary amount.
In this section we would like to model the situation where penalty for violations of antitrust law is represented by a …xed monetary amount. In this case we assume that the …ne does not depend on the accumulated gains from price-…xing and constant over time. This might be a good framework to study the e¢ ciency of antitrust enforcement in an environment where there exists an upper bound for penalties and o¤ences are so grave that punishment always reaches its upper bound, which is true for highly cartelized markets. The analysis of this model is quite essential, since the imposition of the upper bound for penalties for violations of antitrust law is still a current practice in most countries. Only Norway and Denmark do not have this limitation.
This model will also allow to take into account DOJ new policy that suggests to increase the upper bound for the …ne for violations of antitrust law up to $100 million. We modify the model of section 2 in such a way that the …ne is given by some …xed monetary amount, S max ; which denotes the maximal penalty. In other words, the antitrust authority commits to a policy of the following form: the rate of law enforcement is constant p(t) = p 2 (0; 1] for all t; and, when the …rm is inspected, the penalty is given by s(t) = 8 < :
In this section we show that if the …xed penalty (or upper bound for the …ne imposed by law) is not high enough, complete deterrence is never possible. Moreover, we will derive an analytical expression for the upper bound, which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence of price-…xing. The main di¤erence with the model with proportional penalty is that the penalty does not depend on accumulated illegal gains. For simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting (r = 0 11 ), the planning horizon is …nite (T < 1); salvage values for both players are equal to zero, so that the transversality conditions are (T ) = 0; (T ) = 0 for both players.
We derive the dynamic system for the optimal control q(t) from the following necessary optimality conditions:
and
The expression (7) gives : (t) = : Solving this simple di¤erential equation in case of …nite planning horizon, we get (t) = (T t): Consequently, we get (t) 0 for all t 2 [0; T ] . This allows us to conclude that the Hamiltonian (5) is strictly concave with respect to q. Therefore, condition (6) is equivalent to H c q = 0. It leads to
However, the control region of the o¤ence rate q is limited by [0; 1], by construction. This implies that the expression for the optimal degree of price-…xing by the …rm is given by
We can represent the optimal degree of price-…xing by the …rm, q, as a decreasing function of both the penalty for violation and time, which is depicted in Figure 1 . The …rst part of this statement is quite intuitive, since a higher expected penalty will, obviously, increase the incentives for the pro…t maximizing …rms to avoid participation in price-…xing agreements and thus reduce the degree of o¤ence, q. The negative relationship between the degree of price-…xing and time is related to the fact that higher gains from price-…xing in the beginning imply that for a longer time period the …rm can take an advantage of it, in the sense that due to increased experience pro…ts from price-…xing will be higher. So, incentives to commit crime decrease over time and, hence, the degree of o¤ence falls.
variable of the …rm changes. The equation for (t) becomes (t) = r (1 e (t T ) ): A complete proof of this statement is available from author upon request. The state-control dynamics.
After we substitute (8) into (1) the di¤erential equation describing the dynamics of the state variable will be as follows:
The solution of this di¤erential equation in general form will have the following form:
where C 1 is an arbitrary constant determined from the initial condition w(0) = w 0 :
To understand the exact dynamics of the state and control variables over time we consider a numerical example. For parameter values p = The optimal degree of price-…xing will have the following form: q (t) = 1 1 24 2t and taking into account the boundaries of the control region we obtain q (t) = Consequently, when all the parameters of the model are …xed, w(t) is increasing over time and the degree of o¤ence is a decreasing function of time. Unfortunately, we must conclude that, for example, when the …xed penalty equals 2, which is the instantaneous monopoly pro…t for the …rm for these parameter values, it does not allow to achieve complete deterrence even in the last period. On the contrary, the last period degree of price-…xing is quite high (75% out of 100%).
We can conclude that the policies with …xed penalty appear to be highly ine¢ cient, since to achieve q (t) = 0 for all t 2 [0; T ] we should have 1
0; which implies Proposition 1 In the optimal control model, where p(t) = p > 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; the no collusion outcome (i.e. complete deterrence of price-…xing) occurs when S max (t)
The implication of this result is that the penalty for antitrust violation, which potentially can provide complete deterrence, should be imposed by the antitrust authority (thus, not by the court), i.e. by the authority which has complete information about the probability of law enforcement. The …ne should be inversely related to the probability of investigation (similar to Becker (1968) ) . Moreover, the penalty should be based mainly on the instantaneous monopoly pro…ts in the industry. Of course, this value is di¤erent for each industry, so the speci…cs of the industry also should be taken into account when the optimal …ne for antitrust violations is determined. The length of the planning horizon should also be taken into account.
However, in real life the implementation of this scheme is problematic, since the court (not the antitrust authority) imposes the penalty and, consequently, the parameter p cannot be veri…ed.
Unfortunately, the …xed penalty system does not always work. For S f ixed < 2 m (1+ (T t)) p for some t; the result with no price-…xing outcome during the whole planning period is not possible. However, the new DOJ policy may be quite successful, since $100 million seems to be Moreover, this result resembles the result of Emons (2002) , where the subgame perfect punishment for repeated o¤enders in a repeated games setting was investigated. The …nal conclusion of the paper is that if the regulator's aim is to block violation at the lowest possible cost, the penalty should be a decreasing function of time. Moreover, he concludes that the …rst period penalty (penalty for the …rst detected violation) should be the highest and should extract the entire wealth of the o¤ender. So, another drawback of this system is that it does not explain escalating sanctions based on o¤ense history which are embedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines.
Another problem with this result is that the …xed penalty, which can ensure complete deterrence, is too high. It is clearly unbearable for the …rm and leads to immediate bankruptcy.
Already for the …rst violation we have to punish twenty times more than the maximal per-period monopoly pro…t. To resolve this "impossibility result" we look for another scheme. Again we take an example from current legislation. This other system relates the penalty to the illegal gains from price-…xing. It has already been implemented in the US, Germany, New Zealand and some other countries.
In particular, in the next section we introduce the penalty as a linear increasing function of accumulated gains from price …xing for the …rm given by the expression (2) above. The proportional scheme appears to be better than the …xed penalty, since it can ensure complete deterrence in the long run even in the case where penalties are moderate.
Analysis of the model, where the penalty schedule is given by s(t) = w(t):
This setup re ‡ects another important feature of the penalty systems for violations of antitrust law suggested by current sentencing guidelines. Namely, that the …ne is proportional to the illegal gains from cartel formation. This more advanced system has already been implemented in the US, Germany, New Zealand and some other countries.
Utility maximization.
As before, we derive the optimal control q(t) from the following necessary optimality con-ditions:
Since the control region of the o¤ence rate q is limited by [0; 1], the maximization condition (11) is equivalent to:
where
We conclude that the optimal degree of price-…xing by the …rm is a decreasing function of both the penalty for violation and the probability of law enforcement. This is also quite intuitive from an economic point of view. The pro…t maximizing …rm will reduce their optimal degree of price-…xing in response to the increase in the rate of law enforcement, since it makes conviction more likely. Secondly, increase in accumulated rents from collusion also rises the expected penalty, and this gives an additional incentive for the …rm to reduce the degree of price-…xing. This allows the system to gradually converge to the socially desirable outcome with no price-…xing.
The analysis of the state-costate dynamics.
Substituting (14) into (1) and (12) gives the following system of di¤erential equations:
A stationary point can be obtained by intersecting the locuses The steady state of the system (15), being located in the positive orthant, is given by
Existence of stationary points. . Comparing these two expressions, we can conclude that the …nal condition for existence of stationary points in the positive orthant is satis…ed for any non-negative only in case that < r: This means that, when the extra bene…ts for the …rm from cartel formation do not increase much with the experience of the …rm in cartel formation, the outcome with no collusion is more likely to be sustained in the long run, since it is less attractive for the …rm to participate in the cartel agreements. So a unique stationary point in the positive orthant always exists, except when p = 0 (i.e the probability to be caught is zero) or when > r (i.e. the extra bene…ts for the …rm from cartel formation increase very fast when the experience of the …rm in cartel formation increases). The optimal control problem does not have a stable solution in these cases.
Example. Next, the solution procedure and construction of the phase portrait is illustrated via an example.
We construct the phase portrait when the parameters are = 0:5; = 1; = 2; p = 0:2; r = 0:2: The : w = 0 isocline is given by 1 ( 
Stability analysis.
Starting with the system dynamics (15) in the state-costate space, we can calculate the Jacobian matrix
Obviously, the determinant has to be evaluated in the steady state ( ; w ; q ). It turns out that trace J > 0 and det J < 0; so that the steady state is a saddle point.
In general, with arbitrary values of the parameters and arbitrary equilibrium values the matrix J has two real eigenvalues of opposite sign and the steady state has the local saddlepoint property. This means that there exists a manifold containing the equilibrium point such that, if the system starts at the initial time on this manifold and at the neighborhood of the equilibrium point, it will approach the equilibrium point at t ! 1:
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The outcome with complete deterrence is sustainable in the long run, given that the parameter p is strictly greater than zero. The steady state with = r ; w = 2 (1+ r ) p and q = 0 is a saddle point.
Proposition implies that in the long run the full compliance behavior arises in a sense that the outcome with q = 0 is the saddle point equilibrium of the model. This means that one can always choose the initial initial value for the adjoint variable such that the equilibrium trajectory starts on the stable manifold and converges to the steady state. Economically speaking, the …rm which maximizes pro…ts over time under a proportional penalty scheme will gradually reduce the degree of violation to zero. However there is one exception: for p = 0 the degree of o¤ence is maximal. The parameter in ‡uences only the speed of convergence to the steady state value, not the steady state value of the control variable. Clearly, a higher increases incentives for the …rm to stop the violation earlier. Basically, deciding on the time of stopping the violation the …rm compares the expected punishment and expected bene…ts from crime.
Consequently, since in the setup with proportional penalty the expected punishment also rises when the bene…ts from price-…xing rise, in the long run the system will end up in the equilibrium with full compliance.
Trajectories of the state, control and costate variables of the model.
It is also illuminating to investigate the behavior of the variables of the model over time and with respect to the main parameter of the penalty scheme.
We can obtain analytical solutions for control, state and costate variables of the model only in case p = 0 for all t .
Substituting this result into the state dynamics (1) we obtain that w(t) = m t + w 0 Note that p = 0 never leads to complete deterrence, since (14) implies that the best response of the …rm in this case is q = 1:
Now consider the situation where p > 0. Combining (15) and (14) we obtain that
Even if we have the information about the dynamics of (t) we cannot obtain an analytical solution for the di¤erential equation (16). We can only conclude that in the model, where the penalty is determined by s(t) = w(t), the antitrust authority, whose aim is to achieve no price-…xing outcome at least by the end of the planning period will have to commit to the following policy:
Where t is the root of the equation q(t) = 1
2 m (1+ (t)) = 0 (see (14)). Note, that (t) > 1 for all t is an additional condition for the existence of the root of this equation. Since (T ) = 0; this will be ensured by the condition
So the trajectories of the state, control and costate variables of the …rm together with the most cost e¢ cient policy of the antitrust authority will have the following form. When the …rm is subject to antitrust enforcement with proportional penalty, the degree of o¤ence by the …rm gradually declines and …nally reaches its steady state value. This happens because the expected penalty rises over time as well when the …rm commits o¤ence more often. Consequently, the accumulated rents from price-…xing activities to the …rm increase over time, but the speed of this increase declines when the system approaches the steady state equilibrium level. The aim of the antitrust authority is to block the violation as fast as possible. In this case the most cost e¢ cient policy of the antitrust authority in response to this behavior of the …rm would be to keep the probability of law enforcement at the highest possible level until the state variable reaches its steady state value and then reduce the e¤orts gradually keeping expression (14) q (t) = 1
2 m (1+ (t)) equal to zero (see Figure 4) . A no price-…xing outcome (q(t) = 0) can be sustained, but it occurs only at the end of the planning period. To be more precise, the dynamics of the optimal behavior of the …rm is such that, given the parameters of the penalty system (p and ); the …rm gradually reduces the degree of o¤ence to zero, which happens at time t . After that no more collusion will take place. Consequently, accumulated gains from price-…xing will gradually increase and after t = t will stay at the level w(t ): The parameters of the penalty system (p and ) have an impact on the optimal behavior of the …rm and consequently on the deterrence power of the penalty system, which is measured by the timing of optimal deterrence or, in other words, by the value of t . The higher the and p the closer the t to the origin, and consequently the earlier the cartel formation is blocked.
Sensitivity analysis.
Here we investigate in which direction the saddle point equilibrium moves if the set of parameter values changes. Analyzing the properties of the proportional penalty scheme (s(t) = w(t)); the main parameters of our interest are the scale parameter of the penalty schedule, ;
and the parameter which determines the certainty of punishment, p: They appear to be also quite important parameters for the …rm, whose objective is to maximize the expected rents from price-…xing in the presence of antitrust enforcement. Clearly, the …rm will condition its behavior on the parameters of the penalty scheme, chosen by the regulator (see expression (4)). Moreover, the result obtained below will provide hints on how to choose the optimal enforcement policy to minimize the steady state degree of price-…xing by the …rms.
As a result of the necessary optimality conditions, in the steady state equilibrium it holds that : w(t) = f (q; w; ; ) = q(2 q) = 0;
: (t) = r (t) H w (q; w; ; ) = r + pq = 0;
H q (q; w; ; ) = (2 2 q)(1 + ) wp = 0:
Computing the total derivative of the above equations with respect to we get 0
Performing the same exercise for parameter p we obtain that 0
The next step is solving this system of linear equations with Cramer's rule. In order to determine the signs of 
This implies that
Similar calculations for the parameter p give that
This means that either an increase in the scale parameter of the penalty scheme or an increase in the certainty of punishment would cause a reduction of the equilibrium accumulated rents from collusion, so that the …rms will try to reduce their gains in order to be punished less. The change in or in p only in ‡uences the t value in the Figure 5 12 . Numerical analysis of the behavior of the state and control variables of the model with respect to the main parameters of the penalty scheme ( and p) shows that a higher or p leads to earlier deterrence, i.e. t moves closer to the origin (see Figure 5) . Consequently, the degree of price …xing is lower at each instant of time and total accumulated gains from price-…xing by the colluding …rm are lower. Moreover, this policy allows to reduce the costs for society as well, since we can block violation earlier and hence reduce the control e¤orts earlier. Looking at the partial derivatives of the state variable of the model with respect to the main parameters of the penalty scheme we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 a) Under the policies that provide underdeterrence, i.e. when is low, i.e.
= p 2 [0; 1], the e¤ ects of detection probability and severity of punishment on the deterrence power of the penalty scheme in the steady state are equal. b) When is high, i.e. under the policies that can potentially provide more e¢ cient deterrence, the e¤ ect of the increase of probability of punishment on the deterrence power of the penalty scheme in steady state is much stronger.
Proof:
Consider the partial derivatives of the state variable of the model with respect to the main parameters of the penalty scheme. Following the above analysis they are
Now we can show that, when is potentially higher than p; thus, for instance, when > 1;
the decrease in w, in absolute terms, when increases, is much less than the decrease in w, in absolute terms, when p increases. Assume > 1; then from (17) we obtain End of the proof.
The general conclusion of this subsection is that, when w 0 = 0; only partial deterrence is feasible. But nevertheless, q(t) = 0 for some t 2 [t ; T ] can be achieved in the model if p(t) > 0 for all t 2 [0; T ] and the equilibrium with q = 0 can be sustained as the long run saddle point steady state equilibrium of the model with penalty system given by s(t) = w(t) and p > 0 under certain additional conditions on the parameters of the model.
Moreover, studying the sensitivity of the steady state values of the main variables of the model with respect to the parameters of the penalty scheme we found an interesting result, which gives new insights into the problem of optimal trade-o¤ between the probability and severity of punishment. This problem has been studied quite extensively in a static setting by Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and later by Garoupa (1997) and . The result, stated in proposition 3, shows that, when the penalty is high a further increase in the severity of punishment is less e¢ cient than an increase in probability of punishment.
5 Conclusions.
The main problem addressed in this paper is how the …ne, which takes into account the history of the violation, i.e. determined on the basis of accumulated turnover of the …rm participating in cartel, a¤ects the e¢ ciency of the deterrence. To study this problem, we refer to two main features of penalty systems for violations of the antitrust law prescribed by the current sentencing guidelines. Firstly, there exists an upper bound for the …ne. The penalty is constrained from above by either a certain monetary amount or by the amount of 10% of the total annual turnover of the …rm. Secondly, the penalty is based on the accumulated gains from cartel or price-…xing activities for the …rm. These regulations suggest to model the penalty as an increasing function of the accumulated illegal gains from price-…xing to the …rm.
The main innovation of the paper compared to the existing literature, e.g. Fent et al. (1999) or Feichtinger (1983) , is the idea that the accumulated wealth of the …rm takes the role of the state variable in the optimal control model. This modi…cation allows to incorporate two main features of the current penalty systems for antitrust law violations, discussed above, into a dynamic model of intertemporal utility maximization by the …rm under antitrust enforcement.
In particular, this modi…cation allows to develop a framework, in which the penalty for antitrust violations can be constructed in such a way that it can capture the history of the violation.
In order to capture the history, we model the penalty for price-…xing as an increasing function of the accumulated gains from price-…xing throughout the entire duration of the infringement (which is the state variable of the model).
First, we look at the case where the penalty is …xed. We derive an analytical expression for this penalty, which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence of price-…xing, given a strictly positive rate of law enforcement by the antitrust authority. Numerical calculations show that the new policy suggested by DOJ might be successful. But, unfortunately, this system does not solve the problem of optimal deterrence as well, since the penalties in this case, which allow to achieve complete deterrence, are too high, and thus unbearable for the …rm because they can drive the …rm to immediate bankruptcy.
We also analyze the optimal control model, in which the penalty is determined as a linear increasing function of the accumulated rents from price-…xing. On the basis of this analysis we conclude that the parameters of the penalty system have an impact on the optimal behavior of the …rm and consequently on the deterrence power of the penalty system, which is measured by the timing of optimal deterrence. The higher the probability and severity of punishment the earlier the cartel formation is blocked. Moreover, a proportional system seems to be more fair than …xed and allows to achieve a complete deterrence outcome in the long run. The analysis of this model also con…rms that modi…cation of penalty systems suggested recently by OECD is quite promising, since it will lead to earlier deterrence.
In addition, we conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium values of the main variables of the model with respect to the changes in the scale parameter of the proportional penalty scheme and probability of law enforcement. Studying the sensitivity of the steady state values of the main variables of the model with respect to the parameters of the penalty scheme we found an interesting result, which gives new insights into the problem of optimal trade-o¤ between the probability and severity of punishment. This result states that when the penalties are high a further increase in the severity of punishment is less e¢ cient than the increase in certainty of punishment. This implies that in order to achieve improvements in deterrence when penalties are already high, it is more e¢ cient to spend resources and increase the probability of punishment rather than simply raise the upper bound for the …ne.
We can also suggest a number of possible extensions of the model. One possibility is to introduce a second state variable (o¤ender's criminal record) into the model in addition to accumulated gains from price-…xing. This will allow to relate penalty to both important factors: gravity of the violation and past reputation of the o¤ender (recidivistic behavior). This extension will help to explain escalating sanctions based on o¤ence history which are embedded in many penal codes and sentencing guidelines. Another interesting direction is to extend the analysis to two players case and consider a similar problem in the framework of di¤erential games. One would say that a dynamic game situation would be more appropriate to describe the problem at hand. A pursuit-evasion game of the Feichtinger (1983) type would help to re‡ect the idea that competition authority can also act strategically and not rule based. However, the scope of the current paper, which is aiming to compare the e¤ects of …xed and proportional penalties on the behavior of the …rms that violate competition law, does not require a competition authority acting strategically. Although, the di¤erential game framework would be an interesting extension of the problem at hand in case we want to …nd an optimal combination of both instruments of antitrust authority (…ne and rate of law enforcement), which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence.
6 Appendix. Static microeconomic model of price-…xing.
Let us consider an industry with N symmetric …rms engaged in a price …xing agreement. Assume that they can agree and increase prices from p c = c to p > c each; where c is the marginal cost in the industry. Since …rms are symmetric, each of them has equal weight in the coalition and consequently total cartel pro…ts will be divided equally among them according to the Shapley value cooperative solution concept. 13 Hence, the whole market for the product (in which the price-…xing agreement has been achieved) will be divided equally among N …rms, so each …rm operates in a speci…c market in which the inverse demand function equals p(Q) = 1 Q.
They are identical in all submarkets. Under these assumptions we can simplify the setting by considering not the whole cartel (group of violators) but only one …rm, and apply similar sanctions to all the members of cartel. 14 Further we denote: p m is the monopoly price in the industry under consideration and p = 1 Q is the inverse demand for a particular …rm.
In order to be able to represent consumer surplus and extra pro…ts from price …xing for the …rm ( ) in terms of the degree of collusion, we specify the variable q as follows.
Let q = p c p m c ;where p m is the monopoly price, and p is the price level agreed by the …rms. Then we can conclude that q 2 [0; 1] and instantaneous extra pro…ts from price-…xing for this particular …rm will be determined according to the following formula: 1 3 We also assume that there is no strategic interaction between the …rms in the coalition in the sense that we abstract from the possibility of self-reporting or any other non-cooperative behavior of the …rms towards each other.
1 4 Of cause, in these settings the incentives of the …rms to betray the cartel can not be taken into account and the possibility to in ‡uence the internal stability of the cartel is not feasible. But this is the topic for another paper.
So, instantaneous Producer Surplus will be determined as P S(q) = (q) = m q(2 q):
Net Loss of Consumer Surplus will be the area of the right triangle, i.e. 
